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Sheff v. O’Neill ushered in a new wave of education reform litigation 
that will challenge the constitutionality of de facto segregation under 
state education clauses, but its remedy has been inadequate. This 
Article proposes a new desegregation remedy—the sliding scale 
remedy—to address socioeconomic isolation in this unique 
constitutional context. The remedy employs varying degrees of equity 
power depending on students’ academic outcomes. It balances 
concerns over local control and separation of powers with the court’s 
need to effectuate rights, establishes a clear remedial principle, and 
ensures that states and school districts focus on students as they 
implement remedies.  
 
I. Introduction..........................................................................................................2 
II. The Remedy in the Sheff Case............................................................................7 
III. Defining the Sliding Scale Remedy ..................................................................11 
A. Overview of the Remedy ............................................................................11 
B. The Remedial Landscape ............................................................................12 
1.  Purely Voluntary Remedy (Urban and Suburban Outcomes 
Met) ...................................................................................................15 
2.  Compulsory Inter-District Acceptance (Urban Outcomes Not 
Met, Suburban Outcomes Met) .........................................................16 
3.  Creation of a Regional School District (Urban Outcomes Not 
Met, Suburban Outcomes Met Over Sustained Period) ....................18 
4.  Crisis: State Takeover and Legislative Response (Urban 
Outcomes Not Met, Suburban Outcomes Not Met Over 
Sustained Period)...............................................................................19 
C. A Brief Note on Sliding-Scale Remedies in the School Funding 
Litigation Context.....................................................................................20 
IV. Challenges to the Sliding Scale Remedy ..........................................................21 
A. The Challenge of Localism.........................................................................21 
                                                 
* Yale Law School.  
2 SLIDING TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES [5-Nov-09 
B. White Flight.................................................................................................25 
C. Validity of “The Harm and Benefit Thesis”................................................28 
D. Federal Legal Challenges............................................................................30 
1.  Rodriguez, Milliken, and the “Scope of the Remedy”.......................30 
2.  Parents Involved and the Sliding Scale Remedy...............................34 
V. Advantages of the Sliding Scale Remedy ..........................................................36 
A. Clear Remedial Principle ............................................................................36 
B. Maximizing the Court’s Use of the Agenda Setting Power ........................39 






After over fifty years of litigation meant to correct instances of de jure 
segregation, the rise of de facto segregation has rendered the legacy of 
Brown1 all but meaningless. In 1996, however, a new frontier opened up in 
the battle for educational equity. For the first time, a court ruled that de 
facto segregation could violate a state constitution’s education clause.2 The 
Connecticut supreme court held in its historic Sheff v. O’Neill decision that 
extensive levels of ethnic and racial isolation in Hartford’s public schools 
unconstitutionally deprived students of substantially equal educational 
opportunities.3 Although the state constitution entitled the plaintiffs to 
relief, the court politely punted the sticky issue, “afford[ing] the legislature, 
with the assistance of the executive branch, the opportunity, in the first 
instance, to fashion the remedy that will most appropriately respond to the 
constitutional violations that we have identified.”4 This begs the question: 
will Sheff fulfill its constitutional legacy, or will it simply be a Brown II 
déjà vu?5 
After thirteen years, little has changed in Hartford. Hartford’s low-
income and minority schoolchildren continue to struggle academically; the 
number of children attending schools with reduced levels of racial and 
economic isolation is far below targets the plaintiffs’ targets;6 and the state 
legislature has never mandated that any of Hartford’s surrounding towns 
take action. All remedial efforts thus far have been voluntary, and the state 
                                                 
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that de jure segregation 
of students in schools is unconstitutional and that separate is inherently unequal). 
2 See Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). 
3 Id. 
4 Sheff, 678 A. 2d at 1271. 
5 See Brown v. Board of Education (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (holding that District 
Courts needed to act with “all deliberate speed” to effectuate the Brown ruling). 
6 See infra Part II. 
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has not held itself accountable for its students’ educational outcomes.7  
Connecticut is not alone.8 Throughout the country, a “reluctance to 
utilize fully the courts’ inherent institutional strengths” has resulted in a 
“mixed record of success in both federal and state institutional reform 
litigations.”9 Although the Sheff plaintiffs and their attorneys have “vowed 
to continue their legislative efforts to force greater changes in the racial and 
economic segregation of Connecticut’s schoolchildren,”10 this willpower 
has not been enough. These problems need new remedies.11   
When Sheff was decided in 1996, meanwhile, the No Child Left Behind 
Act (NCLB) was five years away from passage.12 Despite some states’ 
preliminary efforts to measure the educational outcomes of their students 
through standardized tests,13 there was not a nationwide push for 
accountability.14 Back then, the tests were not “high-stakes” and states felt 
no meaningful pressure to adopt them.15  
Today, however, we live in a world of standards-based accountability. 
                                                 
7 Cf. William S. Koski, Educational Opportunity and Accountability in an Era of 
Standards-Based School Reform, 12 STAN L. POL’Y REV. 301 (2001) (arguing that student 
and school accountability to the state is not enough and that states and schools should be 
held similarly accountable to students, parents, and communities).  
8 See, e.g., Montoy v. State of Kansas, 138 P.3d 755 (Kan. 2006); Campaign for Fiscal 
Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006). In these school funding lawsuits, the high 
court in each state deferred to their respective legislatures to prescribe remedies. 
9 Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, The Remedies Problem Posed by Sheff v. 
O’Neill—and a Proposed Solution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1115, 1144 (1997). 
10 DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 170 (2001). 
11 As one commentator recently noted, “[w]e need to rethink the kinds of remedies that 
might work in the education context. Adam Shinar, School Finance Litigation: A 
Neverending Play (Oct. 29, 2009),  LAW AND EDUCATION BLOG, 
http://lawandeducation.wordpress.com/2009/10/29/school-finance-litigation-a-
neverending-play/. 
12 See The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2002).  
13 See ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, 
AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 72 (2009) (showing a graph that shows the gradual increase in state 
accountability systems from 1993 onward). 
14 Cf. Michael Heise, Adequacy Litigation in an Era of Accountability, SCHOOL 
MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 262, 267 (2007) 
(“When many states initiated efforts to articulate desired student academic proficiency in 
the early- and mid-1980’s they did so without the specter of federal liability under NCLB 
or exposure to adequacy lawsuits.”) 
15 Cf. Andrew Rudalevige, Adequacy, Accountability, and the Impact of the No Child 
Left Behind Act, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL 
ADEQUACY 243, 248 (2007) (noting that NCLB is about measuring results and that NCLB’s 
forerunner, the Improving America’s Schools Act, was executed far more slowly at the 
state level than NCLB). 
4 SLIDING TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES [5-Nov-09 
All states currently provide tests to gauge the academic progress of their 
students,16 and these tests provide data that informs both public policy and 
the law.17 While many scholars have criticized the accuracy and legitimacy 
of standardized tests, and NCLB has flaws that I will not thoroughly discuss 
here,18 standardized testing provides courts with a tool to ensure remedial 
accountability.  
 Despite our presence in this post-NCLB world, however, the current 
manifestation of the Sheff remedy does not focus on educational 
outcomes—the best proxy for educational opportunity19—at all. Instead, it 
provides benchmark targets that attempt to minimize the racial, ethnic, and 
economic isolation of Connecticut students.20 Thus, the remedy has focused 
on the means and not the desired ends of the litigation.21 This has been a 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., FREDERICK M. HESS & MICHAEL J. PETRILLI, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 
PRIMER 31 (2006) (highlighting that NCLB requires all states to create academic standards 
and devise tests that assess those standards).  
17 See Heise, supra note 14, at 267 (noting that NCLB obligates all states to participate 
in the National Assessment for Educational Progress (NAEP) to receive federal funds, and 
that this mandate provides a check against state efforts to lower state-level standards). 
18 The most significant flaw in NCLB for the purposes of this paper is the fact that it 
allows states significant flexibility to choose their own testing and accountability 
mechanisms. See HESS, supra note 16, at 31-32. The problem with this is that it has created 
a “race to the bottom” in which some states have lowered their academic standards to meet 
academic requirements. See Marissa Silber, A Response to Failed Implementation: Why No 
Child Left Behind Has Not Been Reauthorized, Proceedings of the Midwest Political 
Science Association (Apr. 2009), at 22-23. If states employ such tactics, it may undermine 
the usefulness of the remedy proposed in this paper unless NCLB is strengthened such that 
state standards are normed against a uniform, national standard (such as those assessed in 
the NAEP). 
19 See infra Section I. There is significant debate on the question of whether or not 
equal educational opportunities are the same as equal educational outcomes. Although 
some definitions of equal educational opportunity focus on equality of inputs to the 
educational system (labor, equipment, capital), “[m]ore recently, attention is turning to 
outputs (e.g., what schools produce, such as types of achievement and graduates) and 
outcomes (e.g., lifetime accomplishments, such as earnings or health status) that are 
variously related to what schools do.” See EQUITY  AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION 
FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 11-12 (Helen F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk, and Janet S. 
Hansen eds., 1999). Courts have also recognized the connection between equal educational 
opportunity and student outcomes. In a New Jersey school finance case, the Abbott II court 
“sought to equalize not money, but achievement.”  REED, supra note 10, at 84-85.  
20 See Stipulation and Order, Sheff v. O’Neill, No. X03-89-0492119S (New Britain 
Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Phase I Stipulation] (providing a timetable for reducing 
racial, ethnic, and economic isolation so that at least 30 percent of minority students in 
Hartford will be in less isolated conditions by 2007); See Stipulation and Proposed Order, 
Sheff v. O’Neill, No. HHD-X07-CV89-4026240-S (Hartford Sup. Ct. April 4, 2008) 
[hereinafter Phase II Stipulation] (noting that the phase I settlement goal was not met and 
increasing the goal of reduced isolation to 41 percent of Hartford students by 2013).  
21 Eric Hanushek, a frequent critic of school finance litigation, argues that “[t]he 
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similar problem in school finance lawsuits, where court remedies have  
focused on specific funding levels.22 Beyond sidetracking the courts’ 
remedial focus on educational outcomes, these means-focused remedies 
exacerbate separation of powers concerns as they force courts to search for 
the “right” amounts of funding or the “right” racial and socioeconomic 
balance of students.23   As I argue in this Article, an effective remedy in any 
school litigation case must be as ends-focused—through the use of student 
performance on standardized tests, for example—as it is means-focused.24  
One of the political challenges of the Sheff ruling is that it is premised 
on the assumption that quality, integrated, schools will promote academic 
achievement among all students. Many scholars have found this to be true.25 
However, many Connecticut citizens—and particularly suburban parents—
do not believe that an infusion of low-income, minority children into their 
school districts will promote the academic achievement of their children.26 
Thus, an effective remedy should focus on the achievement of suburban 
students as much as it focuses on the achievement of disadvantaged urban 
students. From a constitutional standpoint, moreover, effective remedies 
should ensure the academic achievement of all students. This is the only 
way to ensure that remedies will be both politically and legally tenable. 
Using Sheff as a case-study, this Article proposes a new remedial 
framework for courts facing education reform lawsuits. I call this 
framework the sliding scale remedy.27 The framework acknowledges that 
state legislatures and executive actors should initially be empowered to 
design their own remedies,28 but it also structures substantive threats to use 
                                                                                                                            
ultimate objective of an adequacy remedy is to help children, who are the focus of the case 
because either their schools lack resources or their achievement is unacceptable.” 
HANUSHEK, supra note 13, at 145. Resources provided to school districts as a result of 
court victories are merely means to the end of providing better education to kids. Id. 
22 See Robynn K. Sturm & Julia A. Simon-Kerr, Justiciability and the Role of Courts 
in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, at 29-31 (2008) 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=student_pa
pers. 
23 See Id.  
24 Cf. Koski, supra note 7, at 315 (concluding that courts should craft remedies that 
“promise to improve schools and the teaching and learning that goes on inside those 
schools”). 
25 See discussion infra Section IV.C. This parallels an assumption in school funding 
litigation—in particular, the assumption that “money matters.”  
26 See, e.g., KATHRYN MCDERMOTT, CONTROLLING PUBLIC EDUCATION: LOCALISM 
VERSUS EQUITY 28 (1999) (noting that parents in New Haven’s surrounding suburbs were 
concerned about the “contagion from New Haven” spreading to their districts). 
27 For a basic overview of the sliding scale remedy, see infra Section II.A. 
28 See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 22 (discussing how separation of powers concerns have 
threatened to drive state courts out of education reform lawsuits due to threats of funding-
focused remedies). 
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equity power when constitutional standards are not met.29 These threats are 
grounded in a clear remedial principle—academic outcomes.30 Although the 
remedy discussed in this Article is specific to efforts that seek to improve 
academic outcomes through ethnic and socioeconomic integration, the 
principles behind the remedy can apply to all forms of education 
litigation.31 
Regardless, some have argued that the future of education lawsuits will 
eventually resemble Sheff.32 In particular, “Sheff could inspire similar 
lawsuits against other states in which districts are segregated into rich and 
poor, but have been exempt from desegregation litigation due to there being 
no history of de jure segregation.”33 At least twenty-eight states have 
acknowledged that the right to an “adequate” or “equitable” education exists 
in their states, making those states potential breeding grounds for future 
Sheff-like suits.34 In fact, two such suits have concluded since the filing of 
the initial Sheff complaint.35 A recent study of education adequacy 
                                                 
29 But see the Texas Edgewood litigation, in which the court’s injunctive threat was not 
graduated—rather, it was a simple threat to shut down the entire public school system. Id. 
at 43. This threat was never carried out despite the court’s determination that the school 
system was inadequate on three separate occasions. Id. 
30 Academic outcomes, in fact, were one of the primary concerns of the Sheff plaintiffs. 
See Sheff Plaintiffs’ Statement of Principles (Sept. 1996) (on file with author). 
The plan must include an accountability system for monitoring implementation of 
the Sheff remedy that assesses efforts, inputs and results, including the academic 
expectations, commitment to excellence and sensitivity of staff, but ultimately 
measures the purpose of the remedy – school quality and school integration – by 
student performance in academic competence and social attitudes. (emphasis 
added). Id. 
31 See infra Section III.C. (addressing how the sliding scale remedy could apply within 
the school finance context). 
32 See Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III, A Re-Analysis of the Legal Political, 
and Social Landscape of Desegregation from Plessy v. Ferguson to Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 218 B.Y.U. ED. & L.J. 217, 249-50 
(2007); See also RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-
CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 171 (2001) (arguing that the Sheff 
ruling is a highly relevant precedent for the economic segregation argument because it 
departs from the de jure segregation requirements of racial segregation challenges); Molly 
S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the 
Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1365 (2004) (arguing that one of the most 
promising legal avenues to attain economic integration will be through the use of modified 
school integration remedies); See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE 
L.J. 249, 308-09 (1999) (noting that school “finance” plaintiffs should consider arguing for 
socioeconomic or racial integration, or both). 
33 Caldas, supra note 32, at 249. 
34  Nat’l Access Network, “Equity” and “Adequacy” School Funding Court Decisions 
(Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/equityandadequacytable.pdf. 
35 See Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that plaintiffs had failed 
to state a claim under the state constitution’s education article when arguing that poverty 
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litigation, moreover, argues that separation of powers concerns may be 
stemming the tide of adequacy litigation challenges which primarily 
emphasize resources and funding.36 Although challenges of school funding 
systems are likely to remain salient for the foreseeable future,37  the study 
argued that “plaintiffs must find a way to recharacterize both the right and 
the remedy so that they cannot be boiled down to a demand for increased 
funding.”38  Assuming that Sheff-like lawsuits become the wave of the 
future, the use of sliding scale remedies will become increasingly relevant.  
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, the current Sheff remedy is 
discussed in detail. Part III introduces the sliding scale remedy proposed in 
this Article. Part IV then addresses several challenges that opponents of the 
sliding scale remedy could raise. These challenges include the remedy’s 
effect on local control of school districts, issues of white flight that may 
result from the remedy’s implementation, the validity of the “harm and 
benefit” thesis that posits that desegregated schools promote academic 
outcomes, and federal legal challenges to the remedy from cases such as 
Milliken and Parents Involved. Before concluding, Part V discusses several 
unique advantages of the sliding scale remedy—the remedy establishes a 
clear remedial principle for future courts, maximizes the use of the court’s 
agenda-setting power, and re-centers the focus of the court remedy on 
students as it reduces moral hazard problems both within school districts 
and the state. 
  
II. THE REMEDY IN THE SHEFF CASE 
 
After the Sheff court deferred to the state legislature, the Connecticut 
General Assembly produced a remedy that emphasizes voluntary school 
choice between Hartford and its surrounding school districts. The 
legislation was codified in Public Act 97-290,39 and has since been 
                                                                                                                            
and minority concentration deprived plaintiffs of adequate educational opportunity). In 
NAACP v. State, a Minneapolis case, the parties reached a settlement agreement calling for 
an inter-district transfer plan to relieve racial and economic isolation.  Minneapolis Branch 
of the NAACP v. State, No. 95-014800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1995). 
36 See Sturm, supra note 22. 
37 See, e.g., Lobato v. State, No. 08SC185 (Co. Oct. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/opinions/2008/08SC185.pdf (holding 
that plaintiffs may challenge the constitutionality of the state’s school funding system). The 
court specifically noted that “[i]mportant differences exist between federal and state 
constitutional law on judicial power and the separation of powers.” Id. at 29. 
38 Sturm, supra note 22, at 51-52. Socioeconomic integration is suggested as one such 
non-monetary remedy. Id. at 52. 
39 Act of June 26, 1997, 1997 Conn. Acts 1113 (Spec. Sess.) (codified as amended at 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-220 et seq. (2009)). 
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supplemented by two settlement agreements.40 The legislation provides for 
an Open Choice program, inter-district magnet schools, and other programs 
that allow students to attend schools that are less ethnically and racially 
isolated.41 Although Theodore Sergi, the commissioner of education, noted 
that “[i]t would be bad public policy . . . to forget about our responsibility 
for students learning how to read, write, and compute as we worry about the 
responsibility,”42 the legislation does not enumerate specific academic 
outcomes that must be met.43  
The programs proposed in the legislation were not broad in scope. 
Initial commentary noted that the programs “would affect only about one 
thousand students out of a total of over five hundred thousand statewide.”44 
Over the past several years, only between 1,500 and 2,000 students have 
been served by the Open Choice program—this program allows urban 
students to attend public schools in nearby suburban school districts on a 
space-available basis.45 Growth of this program has remained stagnant due 
to the “lack of seats offered by suburban districts and the inadequacy of 
support services for students and teachers involved in the program.”46 A 
report entitled Missing the Goal indicated that, as of the 2006-07 school 
year, only 16.9% of Hartford students were in reduced isolation schools, far 
short of the goal of 30%.47 Very recently, Hartford’s superintendent of 
schools stated that he was “frustrated” by the lack of state and regional 
commitment for implementation of the racial-equity provisions in the Sheff 
vs. O'Neill settlement.48 Although a lot of “lip service” has been paid, he 
noted that little is being done outside of Hartford to assist in the remedy’s 
implementation.49  
                                                 
40 See Phase I Stipulation; Phase II Stipulation. 
41 § 2(b), 1997 Conn. Acts at 1114. 
42 Rick Green, Adamant Defense Livens Up Sheff Case, Hartford Courant, September 
19, 1998. 
43 But see § 3(b), 1997 Conn. Acts at 1115 (listing improved academic achievement 
among the purposes of the program created under the legislative remedy). 
44 MCDERMOTT, supra note 26, at 48. Although the focus of the lawsuit is on Hartford 
and not the entire state, this still represents a low proportion of Hartford’s student 
population. 
45 See Connecticut State Board of Education, District Efforts to Reduce Racial, Ethnic 
and Economic Isolation in 2004-2006, February 2007. The program also allows suburban 
students to attend schools in a nearby urban center. Id.  
46 Id. at 10. 
47 See Jack Dougherty, Jesse Wanzer, & Christina Ramsay, Missing the Goal: A Visual 
Guide to Sheff v. O’Neill School Desegregation 12 (June 2007), 
http://www.hartfordinfo.org/issues/wsd/Education/Missing_the_Goal.pdf. 
48 Steven Goode, Hartford School Chief Outlines Future Challenges, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Oct. 14, 2009), available at http://www.courant.com/news/education/hc-
hartford-school-superintendent-1014,0,5244419.story. 
49 Id. 
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A larger number of students do currently attend inter-district magnet 
schools.50  Some of these schools have been successful—for example, The 
Metropolitan Learning Center—a global-studies themed Magnet school—
reports that 98-100% of its students say that they will go on to college after 
graduation.51 The Montessori Magnet School, meanwhile, has met adequate 
yearly progress52 (AYP) seven of the past eight school years.53 However, 
only sixteen percent of Hartford’s students are able to attend its twenty 
inter-district magnet schools, and eighteen percent of New Haven’s students 
are able to attend its twenty inter-district magnet schools.54  
The results of the voluntary remedies have been disappointing 
overall. First, participation in inter-district magnet and Open Choice 
programs have fallen well short of goals established by the litigants.55  More 
importantly, the academic outcomes of students in Hartford have not 
noticeably improved since the Sheff remedy was implemented. Tables 1 and 
2 summarize the academic progress of Hartford students in relation to the 
state over the past several years (using NCLB reported data).  
 
Connecticut Mastery Test Results (Grades 3 through 8)
Math 2002‐03 2003‐04 2004‐05 2005‐06 2006‐07 2007‐08
Hartford 57 55 51 46 46 50
State 78 78 78 79 80 81
Reading 2002‐03 2003‐04 2004‐05 2005‐06 2006‐07 2007‐08
Hartford 39 38 38 39 36 39
State 72 72 71 73 72 73
*Data Summarized From NCLB Reports  (2003‐2008)
Percentages  Represent % of Students Who Meet the State Proficiency Bar  
                                                 
50 Approximately 15,000 students currently attend Interdistrict magnet schools in the 
Sheff region. Id. at 3. 
51 See Wadhwa, Anita, Crossing the Line & Closing the Gap: Interdistrict Magnet 
Schools as Remedies for Segregation, Concentrated Poverty and Inequality 5 (Charles 




52 Adequate Yearly Progress refers to the percentage of the children that must score 
“proficient”  on state math and reading assessments in a given year. See HESS, supra note 
16, at 33-34. The state sets this bar and must raise it to 100% by 2013-14 under the No 
Child Left Behind Act. Id. at 34. 
53 Wadhwa, supra note 51, at 7. 
54 Connecticut State Board of Education, District Efforts to Reduce Racial, Ethnic and 
Economic Isolation in 2004-2006, February 2007, at 9. 
55 See Phase II Stipulation (noting that the goals set forth by the Phase I Stipulation 
were not met as of the date of the Phase II Stipulation).  
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Table 1. Comparative NCLB Proficiency of Elementary Students 
 
Connecticut Aptitude Performance Test Results (Grade 10)
Math 2002‐03 2003‐04 2004‐05 2005‐06 2006‐07 2007‐08
Hartford 37 33 39 42 38 42
State 76 71 75 77 75 77
Reading 2002‐03 2003‐04 2004‐05 2005‐06 2006‐07 2007‐08
Hartford 44 33 43 48 43 46
State 77 76 78 78 77 80
*Data Summarized From NCLB Reports  (2003‐2008)
Percentages  Represent % of Students Who Meet the State Proficiency Bar  
Table 2. Comparative NCLB Proficiency of High School Students 
 
Interestingly, the advent of NCLB and mandated accountability 
reporting came around the same time as the Sheff remedy’s adoption. This 
created a quasi-experimental framework to test the viability of purely 
voluntary desegregation remedies, and this achievement data resoundingly 
indicates that the voluntary remedies have done little to equalize the 
educational opportunities between Hartford and surrounding areas in the 
state.56  
It is unsurprising that the voluntary choice experiment has been 
unsuccessful. Rather than focusing on students and their achievement, the 
remedy has solely focused on minimizing racial and economic isolation 
through demographic targets and percentile ranges.57 The voluntary nature 
of Open Choice, moreover, provides suburban districts with few incentives 
to accept Hartford students.58 The sheer creation of inter-district magnet 
schools may not be enough, furthermore, given that these schools may 
simply be creaming Hartford’s top students “off the top.”59 Inter-district 
magnet and choice schools cannot advance the academic outcomes of 
students who do not choose to attend those schools. 
Ultimately, however, Public Act 97-290 holds the state accountable 
for the academic outcomes of Hartford students. The statute lists academic 
                                                 
56 The data says nothing about the utility of desegregation as a remedy in general, 
however. Only a fraction of Hartford students have been able to participate in Open Choice 
and Interdistrict Magnet programs.   
57 See Phase I Stipulation.  
58 See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 
YALE L.J. 2043, 2068 (2002) (noting that states do not usually oversee capacity issues in 
school districts).  
59 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 32, at 129 (“Because magnets normally rely on the 
motivation of parents to apply—and because balancing is based on race, not class—they 
tend to attract middle-class whites and the most advantaged blacks.”). 
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achievement as one of its purposes.60 The implementation plan required by 
the statute is required to have “appropriate goals and strategies to achieve 
resource equity and equality of opportunity, increase student achievement, 
reduce racial, ethnic and economic isolation, improve effective instruction 
and encourage greater parental and community involvement in all public 
schools of the state.”61 And the Act further calls on the State Board of 
Education to significantly reduce disparities in student achievement over 
future years of the implementation plan.62 More could and should be done, 
therefore, to improve the academic outcomes of ethnically and 
economically isolated kids who reside in Hartford. 
 
III. DEFINING THE SLIDING SCALE REMEDY 
 
 While most states have used the NCLB law and testing regime to 
enforce school districts’ and students’ accountability to the states, the 
sliding scale remedy holds states accountable for the educational results of 
students in affected districts. This remedy may be applied to the 
Connecticut context and, by extension, by virtually any state-level court that 
wishes to remedy a constitutional violation in which students of that state 
are deprived of equitable educational opportunities. 
 
A.  Overview of the Remedy 
 
 The starting point of the sliding scale remedy leverages the agenda-
setting power of courts to encourage the State to undertake voluntary 
efforts—both at the executive and legislative level—to address the 
constitutional violation. Initially, the remedy simply acts as a form of 
declaratory relief. If well-defined outcomes are not ultimately met, however, 
the remedy shifts to progressively strong forms of injunctive relief.63   
The sliding scale remedy is a flexible remedy that moves along a 
continuum. At the left end of the continuum are voluntary remedies much 
like those currently implemented under Sheff—inter-district magnet schools 
and Open Choice programs that aspire to integrate students from 
communities of different racial and socioeconomic statuses. The middle of 
the continuum entails “compulsory acceptance”—in which the court may 
enjoin suburban school districts to accept students from socioeconomically 
                                                 
60 § 3(b), 1997 Conn. Acts at 1115. 
61 § 4(a), 1997 Conn. Acts at 1116 (emphasis added). 
62 Id. 
63 Cf. REED, supra note 10, at 170-71 (arguing that using declaratory relief in 
conjunction with the threat of injunctive relief focuses the attention of legislatures in 
meaningful ways). 
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disadvantaged regions of the community. If necessary, the sliding scale 
remedy would allow state courts to mandate creation of a regional school 
district throughout a greater metropolitan area. The scope of the remedy is 
assessed periodically, and the remedy may shift left or right on the 
continuum in any given period. 
 
 
Figure 1. School District Consolidation Continuum  
 
 Academic outcomes are what ultimately drive movement along this 
remedial continuum. When a state court determines that students are 
deprived of adequate educational opportunities—either based on 
socioeconomic or ethnic isolation—the court must consistently monitor 
those results to gauge the appropriate scope of the remedy. If, as a result of 
racial and economic isolation, students are deemed to be deprived of 
educational opportunities, the court has an obligation to use its equity power 
to ensure that educational opportunities are present, and the easiest way for 
courts to gauge the existence of educational opportunities is through test 
score growth.64 While the court has an obligation to wield its equity power 
in these contexts, however, the remedy also considers the performance of 
suburban students—their educational outcomes must not be significantly 
dampened as a result of the court’s injunctive measures. 
 
B.  The Remedial Landscape 
 
This section briefly outlines four remedial possibilities that may occur 
when a court employs the sliding scale remedy. All of the discrete 
possibilities are dependent on student academic outcomes over the course of 
a remedy’s implementation. The court first sets a reasonable, annual growth 
target on the state’s standardized test (the CMT and CAPT tests for 
Connecticut).65 The court also sets a target proficiency percentage for the 
                                                 
64 Allowing the remedy to operate based on a growth model with a reasonably high 
long-term target is optimal for both the state and the plaintiffs. In Hancock v. 
Commissioner of Education, 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005), State defendants conceded 
that progress towards state proficiency standards is the constitutional standard in 
Massachusetts. See Robert M. Costrell, The Winning Defense in Massachusetts, SCHOOL 
MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 278, 281 (2007). 
65 When I discuss growth targets, I refer to the percentage of students who are meeting 
state standards on the relevant state test. The percent of students who meet the 
“Proficiency” target is reported to the Federal Government under NCLB to determine the 
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entire region.66 As part of the remedy, the state designates surrounding 
school districts as participating districts, much as the state legislature did 




                                                                                                                            
extent to which the state has met adequate yearly progress (AYP). This could also be 
designed as an average raw score (or percentage correct) on the test, so as to ensure that 
teachers focus on the achievement of all students. 
66 To simplify discussion, I suggest one overarching proficiency target. Of course, this 
proficiency target can incorporate performance in different subjects such as reading, math, 
and science.  
67 See Dougherty, supra note 47, at 3 (listing the twenty-two towns that comprise the 
Sheff region). 
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Figure 2. Remedial Possibilities Based on Student Outcomes 
 
Figure two illustrates the four remedial possibilities in more detail.68 
First, whenever the outcomes of urban students are improving, remedies are 
purely voluntary and all districts are free to make adjustments based on 
their particularized needs. The court exercises additional levels of equity 
power, however, when suburban student outcomes remain above 
proficiency target levels either for brief or sustained periods and urban 
students are not achieving at adequate levels (bottom-left quadrant). This 
may lead to compulsory acceptance requirements or the creation of a 
regional school district. Finally, achievement of all students may be 
inadequate for a sustained period of time. In these rare instances, the court 
would declare a crisis situation and delegate further action back to the state 
legislature with specific guidance. 
The sliding scale remedy provides incentives that will encourage 
voluntary compliance by suburban school districts and the state in ways that 
will improve educational outcomes for students both inside and outside of 
Hartford.69 Under the remedy, it will be in the state’s best interest to 
improve the quality of education within Hartford as it expands options for 
voluntary integration.70 If Hartford’s academic outcomes improve while 
voluntary remedies are being utilized, Hartford students will be meeting 
reasonable, court-mandated AYP targets and suburbs will largely maintain 
                                                 
68 When examining the four quadrants in the figure a plus sign means that, in a given 
year, either (a) students are currently at or above the court’s proficiency target or (b) 
students have grown at a proficiency rate at or above the court’s growth rate. A minus sign 
means that (a) students who are below the court’s proficiency target have not grown at the 
court’s growth rate or that (b) students who were originally above the court’s proficiency 
target dropped below the proficiency target. 
69 See, e.g., infra Section V.B.  
70 See discussion infra Section V.C.  
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local autonomy. However, to the extent that the state fails to take action on 
its own to encourage greater performance in the Hartford school district, the 
court must act to reduce racial and economic isolation of its students. 
 
1. Purely Voluntary Remedy (Urban and Suburban Outcomes Met) 
 
Initially, the remedy focuses on voluntary measures such as inter-district 
magnet schools and voluntary choice programs. Open Choice and inter-
district magnet schools would be opened in the metropolitan area, and 
suburbs would have the option to accept students from Hartford and send 
their students to inter-district magnet schools. Districts may take any 
additional voluntary steps that serve the purpose of improving achievement 
of students in the region and reducing racial and economic isolation. 
As the program unfolds, the court gauges the academic performance of 
the racially and economically isolated region (in this case, Hartford) 
according to the growth goal stipulated by the court. This assessment is 
done in relation to a baseline that is calculated in Year One. In the 
hypothetical scenario presented in Figure 3, the growth goal has been set at 
5%.71 In each year that Hartford meets its growth goal, the court will not 
apply additional equity power and the remedy will continue to be entirely 




Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Suburban District 80% 82% 78% 81% 80% 82% 84% 82% 85%
Hartford 53% 59% 63% 68% 73% 78% 80% 81% 81%










Figure 3. Hypothetical Where Purely Voluntary Programs Would Be Allowed• 
 
Note that, as Figure three illustrates, Hartford’s proficiency rate 
generally grows at a rate at or above the growth goal. It is only between 
                                                 
71 A growth goal of 5% means that, in a given year, 5% more students will meet the 
“Proficient” standard on the Connecticut Mastery Test (CMT) and the CAPT. Note that the 
setting of the growth goal can be reasonably constructed based on expert testimony, and 
that my choice of 5% is simply illustrative. Additionally, 5% growth could be defined as a 
5% growth in average raw score (or percent correct).  
• Note that the achievement proficiency for Hartford is calculated based on the 
achievement of students from Hartford, whether or not they are served in suburban 
districts. The achievement proficiency for suburban districts is calculated based on the 
achievement of students from the suburban districts. In each district, data for Hartford and 
suburban students’ achievement should be disaggregated. 
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years two and three that Hartford does not meet its growth goal (4% as 
opposed to 5%). In this year, the court issues a formal warning to the state 
and suburban districts—such a warning will indicate that, if the state—in 
concert with school districts—fails to improve achievement of racially and 
socioeconomically isolated students, additional equity power may be 
exercised down the line. In this hypothetical, however, the percentage of 
students who meet the proficiency standard sufficiently grows from years 
three to seven such that the target proficiency goal of 80% is ultimately met. 
As long as Hartford students are at or above this target proficiency level, the 
need for further intervention is no longer necessary because educational 
opportunities—as measured by outcomes—for students in Hartford are 
sufficiently equalized relative to those students’ peers in their region.  
 This illustrative hypothetical represents an ideal situation in which, 
under the sliding scale remedy, courts would not need to further enjoin 
Hartford’s surrounding school districts that have chosen to participate in a 
voluntary regime. In the purely voluntary Open Choice/Interdistrict Magnet 
School world that exists today, however, we have seen that the educational 
outcomes of Hartford students have remained far behind state averages.  
 
2. Compulsory Inter-District Acceptance (Urban Outcomes Not Met, 
Suburban Outcomes Met) 
 
In some cases, the state’s efforts may consistently fail to produce the  
outcomes prescribed by the court. The court would execute its threat to use 
additional equity power to ensure that the outcomes are met in the long-
term. Thus, although the remedy remains largely voluntary (with respect to 
its programmatic aspects), the court may force the hand of the state to 
ensure that these programs are being fully utilized to drive student 





Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Suburban District 80% 82% 84% 85% 78% 81% 81% 80% 82%



















Figure 4. Hypothetical Where Court Enjoins State to Compel Inter-district Acceptance 
 
 Maintaining an annual growth goal of 5% along with a target of 
80%, this example shows how the equity power of the court may be 
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expanded or contracted over time. In year two of this hypothetical, the state 
receives a warning because socioeconomically isolated students have not 
grown according to the growth goal. In year three, the court enjoins the state 
to compel its suburban districts to accept a specified number of 
socioeconomically isolated students from Hartford.72 This happens if two 
conditions are met: 
1. Hartford students do not meet their annual growth goal. 
2. The suburban districts’ students have achieved at a level at or 
above the previous year.73 
Because these conditions are met in year three, suburban districts are in a 
position that enables them to accept an incremental number of Hartford 
students.  Thus, suburban districts in this hypothetical would be compelled 
to accept Hartford students.74 These students would be assigned based on an 
individualized assessment that determines whether or not students are 
socioeconomically isolated.75 
 In year five, however, the academic outcomes of the suburban 
districts in this hypothetical decline below the target proficiency level. In 
that year, the court would reduce the number of students compelled to 
attend school in the suburban districts. When achievement is declining in 
suburban districts, these districts are not in a position to accept more 
students. Nevertheless, the court still must compel the state to send students 
to those districts that have maintained or improved their performance in 
year three. Additionally, the state must account for its failure to ensure that 
the performance level of suburban students is being maintained. 
 Continuing through the remaining years of the hypothetical, 
Hartford’s suburban districts will again be compelled to accept additional 
low-income Hartford students in years six and seven. This is because, in 
both years, the achievement of the suburban districts remains above the 
target as the achievement of Hartford students fails to grow at rates 
consistent with the court-ordered growth rate. In year eight, however, 
Hartford students achieve sufficiently high so that there is no need for 
                                                 
72 Because the sliding-scale remedy is gradual, this specified number of students 
should be at a reasonable level (not unduly burdensome to districts). 
73 This assumes that the suburban district’s proficiency is above the court-determined 
proficiency target (in this case, 80%). If suburban districts are below the target proficiency, 
they must be growing at a rate commensurate with the growth rate to have “achieved at a 
level at or above the previous year.” 
74 For simplicity, I focus my discussion on suburban districts as a whole. The court 
may consider the academic performance of individual suburban districts in deciding the 
preferred order in which suburbs must accept Hartford students. However, student 
assignments should be distributed as uniformly as possible across the metropolitan region.  
75 This would entail a holistic assessment of racial, ethnic, and economic demographics 
of each individual student. 
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further judicial intervention. At year nine, Hartford students have reached 
the achievement proficiency target. Thus, the court does not mandate any 
additional levels of compulsory acceptance. 
 
3. Creation of a Regional School District (Urban Outcomes Not Met, 
Suburban Outcomes Met Over Sustained Period) 
 
In instances where students who reside in suburban school districts 
continue to achieve at or above established benchmarks while urban 
students fail to grow or remain consistently high in their achievement levels 
for a sustained period of time, the sliding scale remedy may eventually 
compel the court to enjoin the state to create a metropolitan school district 
in an urban area. This option would be viewed as a last resort, but would 
reflect the spirit of the Sheff ruling. As noted in the Sheff dissent, one 
implication of the majority opinion was that a remedy would require a 
“statewide realignment of school districts.”76 
Should a metropolitan district be necessary, it may be a result of 
suburban districts’ failure to support the achievement of urban students. By 
the time this injunctive option will have been considered, the court will 
have already mandated that many city students attend high-performing 
suburban schools. If the students who are compulsorily accepted into 
suburban districts fail to improve their achievement levels at this point (and 
suburban students are still achieving at high levels), suburban districts have 
likely neglected to undertake the efforts necessary to improve the 
achievement of Hartford students. This failure of suburban districts to “play 
their part” would justify a more intrusive remedy. 
Meanwhile, if suburban districts have done their part in educating 
students that are mandated to attend schools in their district and the 
academic achievement of socioeconomically isolated students continues to 
stagnate, this indicates one of two possibilities. The first possibility is that 
the urban district may be operating efficiently with its resources but, even 
with that efficiency, it simply cannot overcome the challenges of 
socioeconomic isolation. In this case, a larger, regional district may be the 
only way that the state could fulfill its constitutional obligation. The second 
possibility is that the urban district is not operating efficiently. In that case, 
the court may compel the state to improve the efficiency of the urban 
district before taking the step to require regionalization.  
If the court determines that school district consolidation is the most 
efficient step, it should force the legislature’s hand. School district 
consolidation can produce positive academic outcomes. Although 
Christopher Berry found that the gains in educational outcomes that result 
                                                 
76 Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1332 (Conn. 1996) (Borden, J., dissenting). 
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from increasing school district size can be reduced by the effects of having 
larger schools within those districts,77 Sebold and Dato (1981) found a 
positive relationship between student outcomes and district size for 
Califonia high schools, and Ferguson and Ladd (1996) discovered a positive 
relationship for elementary schools in Alabama.78 District consolidation 
may be “the elephant in the room” for some, but it may be economically 
inefficient to maintain small local schools in rural or suburban towns.79 A 
recent study also found that school district regionalization in Arkansas 
would produce a 34% cost savings per student due to reduced inefficiencies 
in spending on teacher salary and supply costs.80 
 
4. Crisis: State Takeover and Legislative Response (Urban Outcomes Not 
Met, Suburban Outcomes Not Met Over Sustained Period) 
 
In the worst-case scenario, voluntary results may fail to produce 
adequate academic achievement for both suburban students and 
socioeconomically isolated students for a sustained period of time—in 
particular, the achievement of suburban districts may decline while the 
achievement of socioeconomically isolated students fails to grow (or 
perhaps sinks below the proficiency target). In these instances, the court 
would not be allowed to compel additional participation by suburban 
districts. This would constitute a crisis situation of a far broader nature that 
may necessitate significant state action. Whatever the reason—inadequate 
state funding, poor management of districts by the state, or some other 
exogenous factor—the state needs to take steps above and beyond 
socioeconomic desegregation to improve educational quality. Thus, in such 
instances the court should provide the state legislature with comprehensive 
remedial principles based on a full and complete definition of a “meaningful 
educational opportunity.”81 In these instances, courts should be “specific in 
their findings about mismanagement, waste, inefficient practices, 
constraints imposed by collective bargaining agreements, state tenure laws, 
                                                 
77 See Christopher R. Berry, School District Consolidation and Student Outcomes: 
Does Size Matter, in BESIEGED: SCHOOL BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION 
POLITICS  56, 76 (William G. Howell ed., 2005).  
78 Berry, supra note 77, at 65.  
79 See, e.g., HANUSHEK, supra note 13, at 284. 
80 See Marvin E. Dodson III & Thomas A. Garrett, Inefficient Education Spending in 
Public School Districts: A Case for Consolidation?, 22 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 270, 279 
(2004). 
81 For a good discussion of principles that could encompass such a definition, see 
Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful Educational Opportunity,” and the Necessary 
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C.L. REV. 1467 (2007). 
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and so on . . . .”82 Providing these clear principles and specific findings 
would provide useful guidance and leverage to the state legislature as it 
determines the next course of action.83And, in the spirit of the sliding scale 
remedy, the court should threaten specific remedial actions that will be 
imposed on the legislature if it fails to remove the state from the crisis 
situation.  
 
C.  A Brief Note on Sliding-Scale Remedies in the School Funding 
Litigation Context 
 
As Kahlenberg has noted in his volume advocating for socioeconomic 
integration of schools, “[m]oney clearly does matter, but breaking up 
concentrations of poverty—which will also tend to equalize funding—
matters much more.”84 The sliding scale remedy attempts to address this 
problem in the school desegregation context. Nevertheless, courts could 
consider applying an analogous remedy in the school funding litigation 
context. Such a remedy could, for example, award additional finances to 
low- performing districts which continue to grow academically yet continue 
to lag behind the academic targets set by the state. Many school finance 
systems do not focus either directly or effectively on student achievement 
goals, and Hanushek argues for stronger accountability mechanisms for 
school funding regimes.85 
 An analogous school funding sliding scale remedy would not 
specify a specific target funding amount. Like the sliding scale remedy for 
school desegregation, it would adjust funding levels based on student 
outcomes. In school finance litigation suits, remedies have usually focused 
on specific levels of school funding,86 and courts have often relied on 
“costing out” studies to guide them in determining appropriate levels of 
funding that are associated with a particular remedy. Costing out studies are 
limited in their ability to aid courts in constructing remedies, however, 
because it is extremely difficult to determine which levels of funding will 
ensure particular educational outcomes, and there is a disagreement among 
scholars on the degree of funding necessary to ensure outcomes are met.87 
                                                 
82 HANUSHEK, supra note 13, at 283. 
83 See Id. 
84 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 32, at 84. 
85 HANUSHEK, supra note 13, at 260.  
86 See, e.g., Christopher E. Adams, Comment, Is Economic Integration the Fourth 
Wave in School Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1614-15 (2007);  
87 Adams, supra note 86, at 1626. See also Eric A. Hanushek, The Alchemy of 
“Costing Out” an Adequate Education (Sept. 2006) (revised version of paper prepared for 
the conference on Adequacy Lawsuits: Their Growing Impact on American Education) 
(arguing that no methodology can effectively show how much “adequate” schools cost), 
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Just as it is not clear as to which socioeconomic balances will produce ideal 
outcomes in classrooms, it also may be unclear how much funding—along 
with how it is provided—will produce outcomes in a particular context.  
 
IV. CHALLENGES TO THE SLIDING SCALE REMEDY 
 
Some may challenge the sliding scale remedy on various grounds. First, 
states have long traditions of local control of their school systems. Thus, 
any court mandated desegregation could be viewed as a violation of 
separation of powers within the state—it may not be within the province of 
the state courts to exercise the remedial power to the extent of the sliding 
scale remedy. Second, some may argue that the sliding scale remedy could 
induce significant white flight from suburban school districts.   Third, some 
may challenge the premise that desegregation efforts can promote academic 
outcomes. Finally, relevant federal precedents may be viewed as a bar to the 
sliding scale remedy. This Part addresses each of these concerns in turn. 
  
A.  The Challenge of Localism 
 
Because the sliding scale remedy may either compel suburban school  
districts to accept students from urban communities or lead to the creation 
of a metropolitan school district, some may express concerns that the 
sliding scale remedy unreasonably infringes on school districts’ rights of 
local control. In this Section, I address the legal significance of this issue 
and its relevance in creating obstacles to the sliding scale remedy. While 
local control principles would undoubtedly create political obstacles to 
reform, the extent to which local control creates legal obstacles to reform is 
actually minimal.  In fact, the state’s obligation to address affirmative 
constitutional rights always prevails. The federalist principles that govern 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s relationships with states are not the same 
principles that guide state supreme courts’ relationships with their 
corresponding localities. 
Local control is often used to sustain impediments to educational 
equality. First, local control provides incentives for districts to use 
exclusionary zoning and other practices to ensure that relatively affluent 
communities may exclude the less wealthy.88 By requiring of minimum lot 





88 Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. 
L. REV. 773, 803 (1992). 
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sizes, limitations on multifamily dwellings, and mandatory-attached two car 
garages, municipalities are able to exclude low-cost housing and therefore 
low-income students.89 In addition, wealthier school districts have 
incentives zone in ways that maximize the local tax base while minimizing 
the local tax rate.90 Left unchecked, local control allows for the perpetuation 
of de facto segregation by both race and class, denying low-income students 
from adjoining towns equal educational opportunities. 
In this regard, purely local control of school districts undermines the 
need of the state to fulfill its constitutional obligation. To the extent that 
local control can be harmonized with the state’s need to fulfill its obligation 
to ensure that its children receive substantially equal educational 
opportunities,  however, there may not be a need to utilize educational 
remedies that restrict local control (in the sense that a remedy forcefully 
crosses the district line). If a particular state fails to meet its constitutional 
obligation, has attempted to work with local districts, and school districts 
fail to cooperate, however, “the courts should not rely on local control to 
deny rights to equal educational opportunity or constitutionally adequate 
education based on state constitutional provisions.”91 
When states have been sued for inadequate or inequitable school 
funding schemes, the state has always had the burden of showing that its 
constitutional obligations are met.92 Because state constitutions confer 
educational obligations, the buck ultimately stops with the state. 
Courts recognize this. In some instances, state courts have been 
deferential to state takeovers of school districts.93 At least twenty-four states 
currently have laws authorizing state education agencies to displace a 
school board and take over the operation of a school district, and since the 
late 1980’s there have been nearly fifty school district takeovers in nineteen 
states.94 As one scholar admits, “[t]o the extent that courts have accepted 
                                                 
89 See McUsic, supra note 32, at 1365. 
90 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 88, at 803 (arguing that towns zone in ways that 
maximize property values and limit the number of school age children who may live in the 
district because this reduces the town’s education burden); Daniel R. Mandelker, Racial 
Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L. 
REV. 1217 (1977). 
91 Briffault, supra note 88, at 811. 
92 Several state courts have made this determination. See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary 
School District No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 813 (Ariz. 1994); Tennessee Small School 
Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 140-141 (Tenn. 1993); Claremont School Dist. V. 
Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 
S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989).  
93 See, e.g., Contini v. Board of Ed. Of Newark, 668 A.2d 434 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1995); In re Trenton Board of Ed., 431 A.2d 808 (N.J. 1981). 
94 Richard Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED: 
SCHOOL BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS 24, 34 (William G. Howell ed., 
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the local control argument, it has functioned as a shield to sustain state 
policy, not as a sword to alter policy in a more pro-local direction.”95 
Additionally, school districts do not have the same degree of autonomy 
as other forms of local government. Typical state constitutions that confer 
home rule authority on particular localities refer to municipalities or cities, 
not school districts—and some state constitutions specifically disclaim the 
applicability of home rule to school districts.96 These localities are 
ultimately creatures of the state and, despite their high degree of power, 
they “cannot complain when the state reclaims its delegated powers.”97 
Others have indicated that, although school districts are commonly provided 
with de facto legal autonomy over their affairs,98 states can expand or 
contract the powers conferred upon school districts at any time.99  
Nevertheless, local control of schools is a “legitimate state objective” in 
Connecticut’s jurisprudence.100 Further, a long-standing norm of home-rule 
makes school regionalization or consolidation proposals politically 
untenable in Connecticut.101 But local control was not the overriding 
consideration in Sheff. In fact, just as the Sheff court acknowledged that “the 
[school] districting scheme presently further[ed] the legitimate nonracial 
interests of permitting considerable local control and accountability in 
educational matters,”102 the constitutional interest of the plaintiffs was of 
greater significance.103 
                                                                                                                            
2005). 
95 Briffault, supra note 94, at 51.  
96 See Briffault, supra note 94, at 32. The Illinois constitution explicitly states that 
local units of government do not include school districts. Ill. Const., art. VII, sect. 1. The 
New York constitution’s home rule article states that the home rule power shall not 
“restrict or impair any power of the legislature concerning the maintenance, support, or 
administration of the public school system.” N.Y. Const., art. IX, sect. 3. 
97 Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1901-02 (2001). 
98 See Briffault, supra note 94, at 26. 
99 Briffault, supra note 94, at 28. 
100 See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) (holding that Connecticut 
school funding system was unconstitutional and that equalization of funding would not 
inhibit local control). 
101 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COLLIER, CONNECTICUT’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A HISTORY, 
1650-2000,  at 632-33 (explaining that efforts in 1969 to pass a bill that would authorize 
the Department of Education to redraw district boundary lines to remedy racial imbalances 
was derailed after the Commissioner of Education claimed to be a “champion of local 
control”).  
102 Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1288 (Conn. 1996). 
103 Id. at 1289 (“Despite the initiatives undertaken by the defendants to alleviate the 
severe racial and ethnic disparities among school districts, and despite the fact that the 
defendants did not intend to create or maintain these disparities, the disparities that 
continue to burden the education of the plaintiffs infringe upon their fundamental state 
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By some accounts, local control is a mere social construction—a 
mythical fiction of sorts.104 Christopher Collier, the longtime Connecticut 
historian, once said that “[t]he towns are not now, and never have been 
since the founding of this state, autonomous in any respect.”105 Susan Eaton 
argues that “the myth of local control engendered a convenient, distracting 
detour around central matters in equal education—place, race, and class.”106    
Federal constitutional law, meanwhile, places few limits on the state’s 
authority to prescribe boundaries of school districts and municipalities.107 A 
school district’s residents do not have federal constitutional claims against a 
particular state if the state chooses to redraw a district’s boundaries and, for 
this purpose, “state governments have broad authority to create alter, or 
abolish school districts; revise their powers; and restructure or even 
eliminate their boards.”108 District boundary changes have only been struck 
down by federal courts when “modifications deliberately impacted 
adversely on the racial balance of students, impeded a remedy for de jure 
segregation, or intentionally helped a religious group.”109 Although we will 
see that Milliken v. Bradley prescribes limits on the federal equity power to 
redress violations of the federal constitution, this case does not place 
significant limitations on sliding scale remedies which address state 
constitutional violations.110 
The practice of local autonomy is currently being brought in conformity 
with the legal theory of state power over education.111  For example, state 
authority over charter schools has provided the state with a means of 
exercising control over local districts. Additionally, the NCLB movement 
has placed more control in the hands of the state as it sets statewide 
standards and holds students and districts accountable for successfully 
attaining them. Because the state is now accountable at the federal level, it 
may decide to exercise more or less authority over local school districts 
depending on the performance of various districts.  
Notwithstanding the sliding scale remedy’s provisions that limit local 
                                                                                                                            
constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity.”) 
104 See, e.g., SUSAN EATON, THE CHILDREN IN ROOM E4: AMERICAN EDUCATION ON 
TRIAL 142-43 (2006) (describing how local control is a legal fiction in Connecticut). 
105 Id. at 142. 
106 Id. at 142-43. 
107 See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).  
108 Briffault, supra note 94, at 29. See also CHARLES J. RUSSO, REUTTER’S THE LAW 
OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 169-70 (7th ed. 2009) (“Acting pursuant to their plenary power, 
state legislatures can set district boundaries, abolish local school units, and/or redistrict 
states regardless of pre-existing boundaries . . . .”). 
109 See RUSSO, supra note 108, at 171 (emphasis added). 
110 See discussion infra Section IV.D.1. 
111 Briffault, supra note 94, at 54.  
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control, the remedy is narrowly tailored to enable local school districts to 
maintain local control to the extent reasonable. Districts are given the 
opportunity to create voluntary solutions long before equity power is 
imposed on them. However, these districts need to be part of the solution—
not part of the problem—to maintain the local control they so desire. 
Legally, local control shouldn’t present roadblocks to state constitutional 
remedies, although such considerations may be an overriding interest in 
federal constitutional remedies.112 
 
B.  White Flight 
 
 White flight can be a significant problem when school districts 
desegregate. Christine Rossell has noted that between 45% and 56% of 
whites leave a school district after the first year of a desegregation order.113 
Controlled choice plans which eliminate district boundaries and allow all 
families to rank preferred school choices can also be problematic because 
they can also produce significant white flight when students from white 
families do not receive their first-choice school.114  
 Any remedy that impacts the racial composition of schools in a 
predominately white area runs the potential risk of inducing white flight. 
For example, white parents may be concerned that the quality of their 
child’s education may be adversely impacted by the presence of minority 
students. They may fear that “students in a newly integrated setting may 
interact poorly with each other (and with their teachers), contributing to a 
strained or hostile atmosphere and poorer education; parents of both races 
may even fear violence.”115  
In constructing a remedy one must be mindful of the social costs of 
white flight. Therefore, an effective remedy maximizes integrative and 
educational outcomes while ensuring that the perceived social costs to 
suburban whites are not large enough to induce flight. If whites do not 
perceive that they will be adversely affected by a remedy, they will be far 
less likely to leave. 
The sliding scale remedy is designed to minimize the impact of 
white flight. Because it is tied to the educational outcomes of all students, 
the remedy will ensure that the degree of equity power enforced on a 
                                                 
112 See discussion of Rodriguez and Milliken infra Section IV.D.1.  
113 Christine H. Rossell, An Analysis of the Court Decisions in Sheff v. O’Neill and 
Possible Remedies for Racial Isolation, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1187, 1208 (1997). 
114 Rossell, supra note 113, at 1225.  See also Christine H. Rossell & David Armor, 
Magnet Schools and Desegregation, MAGNET SCHOOLS AND DESEGREGATION, QUALITY 
AND CHOICE (1994); and Christine H. Rossell, Controlled Choice: Not Enough Choice, Too 
Much Control?, 31 URB. AFF. REV. 43 (1995).  
115 Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 633 (1983).  
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suburban district will be directly related to the achievement of students in 
that district—thus, suburban districts that struggle to educate their own 
students will be less enjoined by the remedy than those districts that 
successfully educate their students. The remedy is also gradual, which gives 
suburban districts and parents time to adjust to their new circumstances 
instead of being “scared away” by the immediacy of a more abrupt remedy. 
Financial incentives, finally, could be designed to run with the students who 
enter the suburban districts, encouraging suburban participation.  
The messaging of the sliding-scale remedy is critical to successfully 
mitigate concerns of white flight. Parents of suburban children must first be 
told that the remedy is initially voluntary. Second, they must be told that the 
only time a court may impose additional remedial pressure on their school 
district is when their children are still achieving at or above previous levels. 
Meanwhile, if the achievement of Hartford students adequately improves, 
little to no judicial intervention may be necessary at all. No compulsory 
remedies will be imposed on suburban districts if they work with the state to 
determine voluntary desegregation plans that serve everyone’s best interest.   
Of course, this argument is premised on an assumption that parents’ 
primary concern in choosing a school district is the academic achievement 
of their students, and that concerns about achievement are a primary 
motivation for white flight. If mandatory integration remedies are imposed 
or even threatened upon a suburban school district, it is possible that parents 
may choose to move outside of the Sheff region out of concerns relating to 
the racial or socioeconomic status of students who go to school with their 
children. 
Test scores have always been a significant determinant of parents’ 
school choices, however.116 Although studies have found that demographic 
considerations may have a greater impact on property values than test 
scores,117 one of these studies notes that “the findings may reflect the fact 
that people make judgments about school quality using easily available 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., Patrick Welsh, It’s No Longer Uncool to Do Well in School, 
WASHINGTON POST, March 14, 1999, at B2 (noting that middle-class parents traditionally 
ask about test scores when considering neighborhoods and visiting schools); See also John 
M. Clapp et al., Which School Attributes Matter? The Influence of School District 
Performance and Demographic Composition on Property Values, 63 J. URBAN ECON. 451, 
464 (2008) (finding that student test scores appear to have increased in importance for 
explaining housing prices in Connecticut in recent years, while the importance of minority 
composition has declined). 
117 See, e.g., Jack Dougherty et al., School Choice in Suburbia: Test Scores, Race, and 
Housing Markets, 115 AM. J. ED. 523 (2009) (finding that, while both test scores and race 
explain home prices, the influence of race was most influential); See also Clapp, supra note 
116, at 463 (generally concluding that people in Connecticut were more concerned about 
changes in geographic attributes than the changes in test scores when deciding how much 
to pay for homes). 
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signals.”118 Indeed, one scholar has directly stated that “[r]ace, being so 
readily apparent, becomes a proxy for school quality that easily tips the 
choice between otherwise equivalent schools and neighborhoods to live 
in.”119 
Parents may have found race to be a useful proxy for school quality in 
the past, but this could change. As student achievement data becomes 
increasingly transparent, the increased emphasis on test scores by parents as 
they choose a place of residence “may reflect increasing public awareness 
of the availability of information on school test scores, along with possibly 
greater saliency of test scores following the passage of the federal ‘No 
Child Left Behind’ Act of 2001.”120 And, despite potential concerns that 
racism may limit Connecticut parents’ desire to send their children to an 
integrated school, a recent study revealed that “many white parents (55%) 
did voice a willingness to enroll their child in a quality integrated 
setting.”121  
By its design, the sliding scale remedy could show parents that 
academic achievement and socioeconomic integration are not mutually 
exclusive ideals. If this occurs, it is even more likely that parents will be 
amenable to integrated schools. When the Connecticut Center For School 
Change held public forums throughout the state to discuss its proposal to 
create a regional school district, “[o]ne message that came through very 
strongly from [its] process is that before [parents] will support changes in 
the status quo, the public must be able to see a connection between 
educational reforms and improved educational quality.”122 
Yet, “if further studies continue to show that suburban home buyers are 
motivated more by racial preferences than by higher test scores, then it may 
call into question the underlying premise for expanding school choice.”123 If 
this is true, however, one advantage of the sliding scale remedy is its 
gradualism. Because urban students would be incrementally integrated into 
suburban districts under the sliding scale remedy, the remedy could serve to 
build tolerance for the intermingling of the races that would not have been 
possible without the remedy. More parents who may have originally been 
more concerned with race than student achievement outcomes may value 
                                                 
118 Clapp, supra note 116, at 464. 
119 Andrew J. Gold, In the Aftermath of Sheff—Considerations for a Remedy, 29 
CONN. L. REV. 1043, 1048 (1997).  
120 Id. 
121 Bilal Sekou, I Support School Integration, But. . .: Sheff v. O’Neill More than Ten 
Years Later and No End in Sight, 42 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 97, 105 (2009). 
122 See Gordon A. Bruno and Kathryn A. McDermott, Beyond the Unexamined 
Remedy: Moving Toward Quality, Integrated Schools, at 2 (July 2000) (on file with 
author). 
123 See Dougherty, supra note 117, at 545.  
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diversity as being useful for their kids. Despite this, a small minority of 
parents may remain intolerant and leave the district for purely prejudicial 
reasons, but this effect would be minimized by the design of the remedy.  
  
C.  Validity of “The Harm and Benefit Thesis” 
 
For the sliding scale remedy to work well, integrated schools must 
produce better academic outcomes for students. Although social science 
research has been divided on the question,124 many studies have found that 
integrated schools produce academic benefits for the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged.  A sixteen year longitudinal study of black children who 
took part in a voluntary city-suburban busing program concluded that 
“those who graduated from desegregated schools were more likely to attend 
college, to complete more years of college, to hold higher status jobs, and to 
work in more desegregated work environments than those students who 
attended segregated schools in Hartford.”125 Several other scholars have 
noted the positive effects of desegregation on academic achievement.126  
Nevertheless, some studies of desegregation and achievement have 
found little or no change in achievement or other educational outcomes for 
white students.127 The NAACP noted in its brief in Freeman v. Pitts that, 
although “desegregation is generally associated with moderate gains in the 
achievement of black students,” “achievement of white students is 
                                                 
124 See DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 
(1995). 
125 ARMOR, supra note 124, at 70.  
126 For a good overview of studies that support the positive effects of integrated 
schooling on educational outcomes, see Derek Black, Comment, The Case for the New 
Compelling Government Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923, 
943-954 (2002). See also Carl Bankston II & Stephen J. Caldas, The American School 
Dilemma: Race and Scholastic Performance, 38 SOC. Q. 423, 428 (1997) (showing racially 
integrated settings are linked to improved achievement for black high school students); 
Jomills Henry Braddock II & James M. McPartland, The Social and Academic 
Consequences of School Desegregation, in EQUITY AND CHOICE 5, 63-68 (1988) (showing 
both long and short term consequences of racially diverse primary and secondary schools 
and colleges, including improved race relations, increased academic achievement, and 
preparation for diverse work settings); Thomas D. Cook, What Have Black Children 
Gained Academically From School Integration? Examination of the Meta-Analytic 
Evidence, in  SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK ACHIEVEMENT 6, 41 (T. Cook et al. 
eds., 1984) (concluding that desegregation has a positive effect on reading scores); Ronald 
F. Ferguson, Teacher Perceptions and Expectations and the Black-White Test Score Gap, 
in THE BLACK WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 273, 289 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips 
eds., 1998) (arguing that teachers’ expectations of students are greater in integrated 
schools, thereby promoting achievement for low-income and minority students).  
127 ARMOR, supra note 124, at 71.  
5-Nov-09] A NEW REMEDY FOR EDUCATION LAWSUITS 29 
unaffected.”128 
Some are also not convinced that the academic benefits of integration 
outweigh the harms. Unfortunately, “[i]n spite of voluminous research and 
writing on this topic, there is still no definitive study of the relationship 
between school desegregation and academic achievement, and no group of 
studies has generated consensus among social scientists who have 
conducted reviews of the research literature.”129 In a recent study involving 
teachers in the Lafayette, Louisiana school district that desegregated in 
response to a 2000 court order, teachers noted concerns that the 
desegregation resulted in increased discipline problems and that the court’s 
“attempt to redistribute the social advantages of the ‘haves’ to the district’s 
‘have nots,’ appear[ed] to have been a zero-sum game.”130  
However, Raleigh, North Carolina recently implemented a 
socioeconomic integration plan which resulted in significant gains for both 
Whites and African Americans.131 Moreover, Project Concern, a precursor 
to Open Choice, illustrated that Hartford students who went to suburban 
schools and voluntarily chose to stay in those schools had significantly 
higher rates of college enrollment and significantly lower rates of dropping 
out than Hartford kids who were not in the program.132 Although David 
Armor has noted that “those who withdrew from the program were having 
more academic and behavioral problems than the stayins,”133 this only 
underscores the need for transparency in communicating the educational 
attainment of those students who transfer to reduced-isolation settings. 
Under the sliding scale remedy, parents will be able to see the effects 
reduced isolation has on the academic achievement of their children from 
year-to-year.  
The gradual and voluntary nature of the sliding-scale remedy will 
maximize the benefits of the harm and benefit thesis while tempering some 
of the concerns that have been raised.  If integrated settings produce the 
                                                 
128 “School Desegregation: A Social Science Statement,” in brief of the NAACP et al. 
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outcomes that many scholars have argued they would produce, districts can 
and will continue to apply the remedy. If integrated settings do not facilitate 
progress towards adequate academic outcomes for all students over the long 
run, courts will not compel further integration. Any adverse impact on 
districts will be marginal because the court evaluates progress on a periodic 
basis.   
 
D.  Federal Legal Challenges 
 
Because states who adopt the sliding scale remedy will be doing so to 
ensure that they are meeting their affirmative obligations under state 
constitutions, most challenges to the sliding scale remedy must come from 
federal constitutional precedents and decisions. Although some of the 
relevant precedents that are triggered by the sliding scale remedy may 
present challenges, I argue that sliding scale remedies would pass 
constitutional muster. 
 
1. Rodriguez, Milliken, and the “Scope of the Remedy” 
 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez declared that 
there is no federally recognized constitutional right to an education.134 
Beyond limiting the scope of federal authority over education, the ruling 
emphasized the importance of local control of public school systems.135 For 
example, the court expressed concern that “other systems of school 
financing, which place more of the financial responsibility in the hands of 
the State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired local autonomy. . . 
. [W]ith increased control of the purse strings at the state level will go 
increased control over local policies.”136 
Although the Rodriguez decision revealed the Court’s normative 
support for local control, however, it did not proscribe any limits on the 
state’s authority to limit local autonomy over school districts.137 The court 
simply deferred to the state’s choice to promote local control of education. 
Thus, Rodriguez does not say anything about the equity power state courts 
may assert within their states. 
Another Supreme Court case that circumscribes limits to state-wide 
educational remedies is Milliken v. Bradley.138 The Milliken Court 
                                                 
134 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
135 See discussion in Briffault, supra note 94, at 40-41.  
136 411 U.S. at 51-53. 
137 But see supra Section IV.A. (describing how the state has the authority to expand or 
contract local control over districts as it pleases). 
138 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) 
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determined that the existence of de jure segregation in metropolitan Detroit 
was not a sufficient reason to impose an inter-district remedy on its 
surrounding suburbs because these surrounding suburbs did not 
affirmatively create the segregated conditions.139 Because it is extremely 
difficult to demonstrate that suburban school districts acted to produce 
segregated conditions, the Milliken precedent created a significant 
roadblock in the quest to create inter-district remedies in school 
desegregation cases.  
It is the Milliken case, in fact, that encouraged the voluntary remedy we 
in Sheff.140 The Milliken court took a much more activist stance than the 
Rodriguez court in promoting local autonomy, stating that “[n]o single 
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over 
the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential 
both to the maintenance of community concern and support for schools and 
to the quality of the educational process.”141  
As the Milliken court conceded, however, “a federal remedial power 
may be exercised ‘only on the basis of a constitutional violation’ and, ‘[as] 
with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the 
remedy.’”142 Because the federal constitutional violation in Milliken was 
solely the de jure existence of segregated schools within inner-city Detroit, 
the remedy was confined to Detroit.143 In Sheff, however, a state 
constitutional violation—de facto existence of racial and ethnic isolation 
throughout greater Hartford—was the issue that deprived children of 
substantially equal educational opportunities.144 Because the state 
constitutional problem of segregation extends beyond Hartford, the remedy 
can extend beyond the bounds of Hartford.145 
                                                 
139 See id. at 757. 
140 The Sheff court, in fact, conceded that the state did not “intentionally segregate 
racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system.” 678 A.2d at 1274. The 
state’s districting statute of 1909 was the “single most important factor contributing to the 
present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system.” 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
141 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-42. 
142 Id. at 737 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 16) (emphasis added). 
143 The city of Detroit, in fact, affirmatively created the segregated conditions within 
its schools. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 717 (1974) (“The District Court, after concluding that 
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school segregation in Detroit, and that the acts of the Board, as a subordinate entity of the 
State, were attributable to the State, ordered the Board to submit Detroit-only desegregation 
plans.”) 
144 See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1281 (“[T]he existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation 
in the public school system deprives schoolchildren of a substantially equal educational 
opportunity . . . .”).  
145 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 32, at 172.  
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Because the sliding scale remedy would only apply to state 
constitutional decisions, state courts would not be constrained in applying 
these remedies. Inter-district remedies imposed by state courts would not 
create the federalism concerns that arise when such remedies are created by 
federal courts.146 As long as a remedy is constructed in a way that does not 
violate the federal constitution, the state has every right to mandate an inter-
district remedy. The only inter-district solution that would explicitly violate 
the federal constitution would be a purely race-based classification 
scheme.147 Because the classification scheme applied under the sliding scale 
remedy would be primarily socioeconomic, there is no constitutional 
violation.  
Even if one argued that the “scope of the remedy” standard should be 
strictly applied to any inter-district remedy, moreover, the sliding scale 
remedy is designed so that scope of the remedy is entirely dependent on the 
scope of the violation. The state and its subsidiary school districts are given 
an opportunity to address the violation as soon as they are told that the 
violation exists. If they do not, the continued existence of the violation is 
that much more egregious, warranting broader remedies over time. Once 
suburban school districts know a violation exists, inaction could be 
construed to represent a form of affirmative effort to perpetuate the 
constitutional wrong. Assuming a legal duty flowed to the State upon the 
decision in Sheff,148 suburban acts of omission add to the scope of the 
violation.149 Thus, as time passes, the Milliken standard could be read to 
allow for additional injunctive relief beyond the Hartford border. 
The Milliken decision can also be distinguished insofar as that decision 
purely related to an inter-district remedy that intended to promote racial 
integration. As the court noted, such remedies require a showing that 
racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a 
single school district have been a substantial cause of inter-district 
                                                 
146 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98 (1995) (explaining that a federal court 
should not impose an inter-district remedy on a state because federal courts are not in the 
best position to take the interests of state and local actors into account when they devise a 
remedy). 
147 See infra Section IV.D.2. 
148 If the legal duty flows to the state, this duty also flows to the school district. In 
Connecticut, school boards are not agents of the towns but are creatures of the state. See 
Norwalk Teachers’ Ass’n v. Board of Education, 83 A.2d 482, 485 (Conn. 1951). 
149 Cf. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1277 (“The defendants' argument, derived largely from 
principles of federal constitutional law, founders on the fact that article eighth, § 1, and 
article first, §§ 1 and 20, impose on the legislature an affirmative constitutional obligation 
to provide schoolchildren throughout the state with a substantially equal educational 
opportunity” (emphasis in original).  
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segregation.150 What happens, however, if economically discriminatory acts 
of the state promote economic segregation? When economic segregation is 
what creates the state constitutional violation,151 one could argue that the 
local policies of municipalities and their corresponding school districts 
affirmatively create those conditions.152 In these cases there would be a 
strong argument for inter-district remedies, even under Milliken. Future 
cases that apply the sliding scale remedy may well address de jure 
socioeconomic segregation that occurs as a result of municipal zoning or 
other similar policies that deprive children from attaining equitable 
educational opportunities. 
Finally, one of the concerns in Milliken was justiciability of the remedy. 
The Court noted its concern that “the District Court will become first, a de 
facto ‘legislative authority’ to resolve these complex questions, and then the 
‘school superintendent’ for the entire area. This is a task which few, if any, 
judges are qualified to perform and one which would deprive the people of 
control of schools through their elected representatives.”153  
The sliding scale remedy is justiciable. The court applies a judicially 
manageable standard, NCLB test scores, to gauge progress towards the 
remedy.154 All policymaking, at least on the front end, is delegated to states 
and municipalities. The court only enjoins future action to remedy the 
condition that created the constitutional violation, and this only occurs if the 
state fails to meet its legal duty. It is less likely that courts will need to 
intervene in policy matters if states and municipalities are given this 
opportunity.155 
 
                                                 
150 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745. 
151 This was not what the Sheff court ruled, but it is a foreseeable possibility in future 
cases. Cf. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV. 
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interpreted state constitutions to require affirmative remedies of de facto economic 
segregation in the housing law context).  
152 Through for example, exclusionary zoning and other tactics. See discussion, supra 
Section IV.A. 
153 Milliken, 418 U.S. 717 at 744. 
154 See discussion infra Section V.A.; See also Koski, supra note 7, at 307 (“Armed 
with specific, clear, and meaningful standards that are the product of such an extensive 
political process, courts are better positioned to overcome their self-imposed obstacles to 
policy reform.”). 
155 Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). Ironically, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the trial court’s intradistrict remedy was beyond its equity power because, in part, it 
forced the state to finance an excessive number of programs within the school district. Id. 
The trial court took this action, however, because it was unable to employ an interdistrict 
remedy based on the Milliken precedent. See RUSSELL WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
REMEDIES LAW 103-104 (2007). If districts are able to voluntarily take inter-district steps 
at the outset, this problem of an excessive structural remedy could be averted. 
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2. Parents Involved and the Sliding Scale Remedy 
 
Parents Involved,156 meanwhile, has had a significant impact on school 
integration plans. The case limited the degree to which race could be 
considered in assigning students to particular schools. Although the court’s 
plurality opinion recognized that remedying the effects of past intentional 
discrimination is a compelling interest,157 that compelling interest was not 
present in the cities involved in the litigation because those cities were not 
subject to court-ordered desegregation at the time of the ruling.158 The 
plurality did acknowledge the compelling interest of diversity in education 
that was upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger,159 but it interpreted this compelling 
interest narrowly to solely apply to higher education.160  
However, in his controlling concurrence, Justice Kennedy argued that 
“[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling 
educational goal a school district may pursue.”161 The main problem with 
the student assignment plans in Parents Involved was that they “employed 
the crude racial categories of ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ as the basis for [their] 
assignment decisions.”162 Race-conscious measures could be applied to 
student assignments that seek to achieve diversity, but assignment 
determinations must be holistic and not be solely race-based.163  
Because “commentary on Parents Involved generally agrees that the 
Court has either closed the door on or left only a narrow opening for using 
racial classifications in student assignment plans,” districts are likely to 
increasingly rely on race-neutral approaches in their attempts to avoid 
racial isolation.164 The Louisville school assignment plan ruled 
unconstitutional under Parents Involved was recently revised and now 
                                                 
156 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 
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157 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720.  
158 Id. at 720-21. 
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considers family income and education level in assigning students.165 
Although another lawsuit was filed challenging the constitutionality of that 
plan, the Louisville superintendent stated that he “looks forward to winning 
this time around” because they worked with attorneys from throughout the 
country to comply with Justice Kennedy’s ruling.166 
Although the current Sheff remedy sets race-based targets for student 
composition in Hartford area schools, legal experts have argued that the 
current remedy is constitutional under Parents Involved because the Open 
Choice and interdistrict magnet school assignment plans do not assign 
students to particular schools on the basis of race.167 Rather, the plans use 
random lottery systems that choose students based on their residential 
communities.168 According to Connecticut Attorney General Richard 
Blumenthal, the ruling “struck down mandatory diversity programs 
containing rigid racial classifications assigning students based solely on 
race.  Sheff programs are voluntary and have flexible diversity goals instead 
of fixed quotas.”169 The Sheff plan would pass the strict scrutiny test more 
easily than the current Louisville plan because, although it has numerical 
goals to place students in reduced-isolation settings,170 race is less of a 
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168 See Wadhwa, supra note 51, at 1 (quoting a personal communication with Dr. 
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factor in assigning students. 
For the above reasons, the sliding scale remedy would not be 
unconstitutional under Parents Involved. First, purely voluntary plans 
during the declaratory phase of the remedy would be constitutional just as 
they are under the current Sheff implementation—they will be based on 
factors other than race, including economic status and place of residence. 
Similarly, compulsory assignments of urban students to suburban schools 
would not be on the basis of race. Rather, they would be based on the 
socioeconomic status of the student and the academic performance of urban 
and suburban school districts. If the court determines that a metropolitan 
school district must be created, student assignments within that district 
would not be on the sheer basis of race either.  
 
V. ADVANTAGES OF THE SLIDING SCALE REMEDY 
 
This Part discusses additional benefits of the sliding scale remedy. First, 
the remedy applies a clear remedial principle that guides courts throughout 
its implementation.  This will provide legislatures and policymakers with 
clear expectations while ensuring that remedial standards are clear and 
consistent. Second, unlike past remedies, the remedy maximizes the court’s 
use of the agenda-setting power. Finally, the remedy encourages a razor-
sharp focus on students while reducing moral hazard problems within 
school districts.  
 
A.  Clear Remedial Principle 
 
One of the major critiques of the Sheff ruling is that it did not establish a 
clear remedial principle. Indeed, this was a critique of the Sheff majority by 
Justice Borden, who “[could] find no principle or standard in the majority 
opinion by which to measure the level of racial and ethnic integration of the 
African-American and hispanic schoolchildren that [would] be 
constitutional.”171 Both federal and state courts that have fashioned 
desegregation remedies have done a poor job of articulating remedial 
principles “in a timely, consistent, and effective manner.”172 Thus, “they 
have failed to provide legislatures, administrators, and lower courts with 
clear, purposeful guidance.”173 
By focusing on educational outcomes, the sliding scale remedy 
articulates a clear, intelligible principle that surrounds efforts to address 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.courant.com/media/acrobat/2009-02/44855273.pdf. 
171 Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1329 (Borden, J., dissenting). 
172 Rebell, supra note 9, at 1151. 
173 Id. 
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racial, ethnic, and economic isolation in schools. This will guide courts as 
they enforce remedial orders and oversee progress of efforts to mitigate 
constitutional violations. Because NCLB is all about frequent measurement 
of academic outcomes, “the law is a boon to the construction of the 
‘judicially manageable standards’ that are so crucial to the adequacy 
argument.”174  
Because the sliding scale remedy sets reasonable growth goals and 
objectively measures progress towards outcomes, courts will know when 
the use of additional equity power is—or is not—appropriate in particular 
contexts. By incorporating outcomes-based incentives into the remedy, the 
likelihood that remedies will simply throw money at problems or integrate 
in ways that do not produce results will be substantially reduced.175 
Courts are likely to defer to standards that are established by state 
legislatures moving forward. Because its state legislature articulated clear 
educational standards, for example, the Kansas Supreme Court said that 
“the court will not substitute its judgment of what is ‘suitable’, but will 
utilize as a base the standards enunciated by the legislature and the state 
department of education.”176 Although Connecticut courts have not yet 
indicated that they will apply the Connecticut State Standards to its 
definition of an adequate education, the state legislature codified its state 
standards and testing requirements into the statutory framework.177 Other 
states have similarly codified NCLB requirements into their own state 
statutes.178 Thus, other courts could reasonably follow Kansas’ lead. 
In embracing the remedial principle articulated by the sliding scale 
remedy, however, courts will need to consider standardized achievement 
scores to guide their remedies.179 Although such output measures have been 
considered to be “important guideposts for determining whether an 
education system is functioning well and whether further scrutiny is 
warranted, [] they are not seen as constituent elements of a constitutional 
                                                 
174 Rudalevige, supra note 15, at 247-48.  
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definition of adequacy.”180 Courts have indicated some hesitancy to directly 
use high-stakes tests in their assessments of adequacy.181  
Assuming that courts fully-adjudicate education lawsuits that challenge 
the racial, ethnic, and economic isolation of students, however, applying 
high-stakes test results to the remedial phase of the litigation would be quite 
beneficial from a separation of powers standpoint. Rather than “strik[ing] 
down the system because the system strikes the court the wrong way, … 
never ha[ving] to explain precisely why it is inadequate,”182 application of 
the sliding scale remedy will provide a clear rationale that explains exactly 
why current, segregated conditions are problematic in a particular school 
system. Legislatures will then know, both ex-post and ex-ante, what they 
will need to accomplish over time to meet the standard. This transparency 
will enhance predictability of future lawsuits, and education litigation 
would not be of the highly-uncertain nature it is today.  
Meanwhile, state legislators know that they are in control of the state 
standards.  If they wish to modify those standards, they may do so, but they 
do so at the risk of political fallout to their constituencies who will demand 
high standards of educational quality for their kids. If, for example, a 
legislature and state board of education set high standards and immediately 
lowered them after losing an adequacy lawsuit (the so-called “race to the 
bottom”), both the local and national community are likely to react in a 
negative way under a sliding scale remedy regime.183 
Finally, the sliding scale remedy will not force courts to answer the 
difficult question of what makes the optimal racial or socioeconomic 
balance in a particular school district or region. Indeed, the social science 
research has not thoroughly addressed this question, and the only answers 
have emphasized that minorities need to be present at more than a “token 
                                                 
180 See Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy, and the Courts, in 
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322, 333 (Martin R. West et al eds., 2007). 
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percentage” to ensure positive outcomes.184 Beyond the practical difficulties 
of setting reasonable racial balance targets, remedies that do not formally 
set targets are less likely to face Supreme Court scrutiny in the wake of 
decisions such as Parents Involved. In this sense, a sliding scale remedy 
would receive less constitutional scrutiny than the current Sheff remedy. 
 
B.  Maximizing the Court’s Use of the Agenda Setting Power 
 
The sliding scale remedy is designed to ensure that the court maximizes 
its agenda-setting power. There are two techniques that allow courts to 
maximize this power. First, courts should make the outcomes of reform 
clear to give the legislature a “meaningful target.”185 Such meaningful 
targets ensure that the legislature can clearly define its own progress 
towards achieving outcomes and adjust its response as needed. Second, 
judges should make use of meaningful and respectful deadlines.186 These 
deadlines consistently reiterate the sense of urgency necessary to ensure that 
remedial steps are taken. In addition, “[t]hreats of injunctive relief and 
retaining jurisdiction over a lawsuit make these deadlines much more 
credible.”187 
These agenda-setting criteria are met by the sliding scale remedy. In the 
sliding scale remedy, the clear outcomes of reform are the educational 
growth outcomes prescribed by the court, and the meaningful deadlines are 
represented by the periodic checkpoints that ensure that those outcomes are 
met. Meanwhile, the specter of injunctive relief—a regionalized school 
district, for example—looms in the background.  
This agenda-setting power will be particularly acute in the state court 
decisions in which the sliding scale remedy is intended to apply. Although 
federalism and separation of powers concerns may limit the degree to which 
Article III courts impose remedial liability on the political concerns of 
states, these concerns do not limit state courts.188 Unlike federal court 
decisions which limit debate and discussion at the state-level, state-court 
decisions promote democratic discussion amongst the political branches and 
the people of a state.189 State court judges are frequently viewed as “part of 
the political process” since they frequently serve for limited terms, are 
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sometimes subject to recall elections, and do not have an independent 
stature that will support them in times of controversy.190 Thus, “state court 
judges, free from the federalism constraints that bind their Article III 
counterparts, are [] accorded a greater judicial space in which to experiment 
and design innovative remedies . . . .”191 The branches at the state level have 
blended rather than distinct functions which are, in many cases, 
complementary to one another.192 State courts thus have every right to set 
and guide the legislative agenda. 
 
C.  Focus on Students and Reduced Moral Hazard 
 
One of the problems with past educational adequacy and desegregation 
lawsuits is that they have provided districts with resources without ensuring 
that those school districts use them in ways that improve district efficiency. 
Since money doled out in the political process is not tied to educational 
outcomes, districts lack the incentives to place the resources where they will 
ensure the best educational outcomes for our children. This, for example, 
occurred in the Abbott districts of New Jersey, where chronically failing 
districts were given almost “unlimited access to resources and programs.”193 
It also occurred in the Kansas City schools that were under the long-term 
remedial desegregation decrees that were challenged in Missouri v. 
Jenkins.194 Although schools in that district had been under an eighteen year 
desegregation order, student achievement in that district was still “at or 
below national norms at many grade levels.”195 And, although per-pupil 
expenditures in Kansas City were close to twice the statewide average, 
performance on statewide tests did not improve relative to peer school 
districts throughout the state.196 It is thus unsurprising that few have 
documented increases in test scores that were a direct result of education 
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5-Nov-09] A NEW REMEDY FOR EDUCATION LAWSUITS 41 
finance lawsuits.197  
These problems have not arisen purely out of a lack of resources or 
support from courts, but at least partially as a result of two related issues. 
First, some school districts have lost sight of the fact that their purpose is to 
serve students. Second, dependence on court ordered funding and remedies 
has resulted in a moral hazard problem that has caused districts to use their 
resources in inefficient ways. 
Several case studies illustrate how urban districts have, at times, failed 
to focus on their students.198 One case study of the Newark public schools, 
for example, indicated that the school system places more importance on 
political connections than merit when appointing administrators.199 Another 
in St. Louis concluded that “the St. Louis school board has taken better care 
of many of its employees than it has of the children whose life chances 
depend on the board’s ability to lead.”200 Another case study of the 
Houston, Sacramento, and Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools found that 
decision-making in the districts was often difficult due to their political 
climate, and that “almost none [of the decision-making] was focused on 
academic achievement.”201  
These anecdotes are strongly connected to the moral hazard problem 
commonly encountered in the insurance context. If we view education 
remedies as insurance policies that are meant to protect against inadequate 
educational opportunities, and the remedies are not time-limited, the 
marginal cost of the remedy to school districts that receive the benefits of 
the remedy is approximately zero. This marginal cost for the district is far 
below the marginal social cost to the state when it provides the remedial 
benefit, and thus the urban district will use “too much” of the remedial 
resources or engage in “too little care” with respect to those resources.202 
To mitigate the moral hazard problem, the marginal “cost” of receiving 
the remedial benefit must be approximately equal to the marginal benefits 
that are being provided.203 In the school remedy context, the “cost” to the 
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district can be viewed as the value-added achievement of students that 
results from the school district’s efforts.204 If value-added academic outputs 
are not commensurate with the benefits provided to the district, 
inefficiencies may result.205 Because the sliding scale remedy holds districts 
in the entire region accountable to growth in academic achievement 
outcomes before exercising equity power, the sliding scale remedy helps to 
reduce some of these moral hazard problems. 
The sliding scale remedy also creates several valuable incentives for 
relevant political actors—all of which force actors to focus on students. If 
the student growth outcomes are not met in the urban district, suburban 
districts understand that additional equity power may be exercised against 
them. Thus, they may wish to provide best practices as they cooperate with 
urban districts over voluntary solutions.  
Meanwhile, urban districts and state politicians understand the risks of 
political backlash if they do not effectively work to improve the 
achievement of students within the racial, ethnic, and economically isolated 
districts. Because student achievement will be part of the court’s remedial 
analysis, an urban district’s failure to improve achievement of students who 
attend school within the district will be as transparent as the district’s failure 
to improve achievement for those students who opt for open-choice or inter-
district magnet programs. Thus, should the court be forced to wield 
additional equity power as a result of an urban district’s failure to 
effectively provide an education with the resources it has inside the school 
district, state authorities—both of the executive and legislative branches—
will not allow the district to continue to operate in that manner.  
For this reason, internal inefficiencies within urban school districts are 
likely to lead to state takeovers or other measures by the state that will 
stimulate efforts by political leaders to maximize the efficiency of the urban 
school district. If the state’s efforts to improve efficiency within the urban 
districts fail, this could simply support the claim that further efforts to 
reduce racial, ethnic, and economic isolation are necessary to ensure that 
efforts to improve academic achievement of urban students are successful. 
This would legitimize increased equity power exercised by courts under the 
sliding-scale remedy. 
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It is worth reiterating that the sliding scale remedy focuses on the 
achievement of suburban as well as urban students as it provides these 
incentives for reform. Even if some moral hazard were to occur within 
urban school districts, there would not be significant “spillover” effects into 
suburban school districts since suburban districts will not be enjoined if 
their students are not achieving at high levels. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
I agree with Justice Marshall when he said that, “unless our children 
begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to 
live together.”206 The remedy I propose in this Article will move us one step 
closer to that ideal. On the one hand, the remedy encourages states, once 
and for all, to show that socioeconomic integration can equalize 
outcomes—and therefore the opportunities—of socioeconomically isolated 
students. On the other hand, it also provides the states and local school 
districts with the opportunity to show that voluntary remedies—possibly 
those that promote little to no integration—can produce adequate outcomes 
for low-income students. 
This latter course may not seem to be a step in the right direction. 
Either way, however, the remedy—if applied correctly—will show that the 
academic achievement of both suburban and urban students is possible. In 
the long term, this will help dismantle many of the current political and 
social barriers to integration. Not only will low-income students’ increased 
academic performance afford them greater long-term access to higher 
income neighborhoods, it will also convince many who currently reside in 
such neighborhoods that learning in an integrated setting is not as 
unfathomable as once thought. State constitutions can and should pave the 
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